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Abstract
This is the second half of a two paper series cover aspects of the NFF phenomenon, which is highly challenging and is becoming
even more important due to increasing complexity and criticality of technical systems. Part 1 introduced the fundamental concept of
unknown failures from an organizational, behavioral and cultural stand point. It also reported an industrial outlook to the problem,
recent procedural standards, whilst discussing the financial implications and safety concerns. In this issue, the authors examine
the technical aspects, reviewing the common causes of NFF failures in electronic, software and mechanical systems. This is
followed by a survey on technological techniques actively being used to reduce the consequence of such instances. After discussing
improvements in testability, the article identifies gaps in literature and points out the core areas that should be focused in the future.
Special attention is paid to the recent trends on knowledge sharing and troubleshooting tools; with potential research on technical
diagnosis being enumerated.
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1. Introduction
Part 1 extensively discussed the organizational complexities
and challenges faced by businesses today in attempts to admin-
ister solutions to the problems caused by unidentified failures.
It also described the applied method for collection and analysis
of the referenced literature in detail. This was included not only
to judge the validity of these papers, but also to present a statis-
tical analysis of the academic journal publications on NFF con-
cepts between the period 1990-2013. In addition, the authors
had categorized the literature into four main areas: fault diag-
nostics, system design, human factors and data management,
where it was noted that fault diagnostics and system design
have been the main focus for NFF journal publications within
the past two decades. Part 1 also focused on No Fault Found
(NFF) standards, and how such events can cause unprecedented
changes in the service performance, impact dependability and
escalate safety concerns. This has long been revealed with a va-
riety of products, within a wide range of industries [1, 2, 3, 4].
This paper aims to elaborate on these outlooks (from Part
1), whilst examining the technical aspects for complex systems
and equipment (particularly products integrated within aircraft
computer systems), and how such events can have a significant
effect upon the overall unit removal rate. Historically, such re-
movals have been seen as an unavoidable nuisance [5], but this
viewpoint is no longer acceptable if the unit removal rate is to
be managed effectively [6, 7]. Unlike those failures that re-
sult in ‘Confirmed Faulty’ events, the designer may have no
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direct influence on those aspects of the system that determine
the NFF failure rate, therefore a direct mitigating action during
the design phase is likely to be more difficult1. It can be argued
that any product removal that does not exhibit a failure (dur-
ing subsequent acceptance test) can be tagged as NFF. Also, for
a number of these events, further investigation could conclude
that the reason for the removal event was categorically caused
by an external effect. None-the-less, this would still be classi-
fied as a NFF event as these external influences might be faulty
sensors (or actuator), or possibly an incorrect fault isolation ac-
tivity. In any case, as the device fabrication process continues
to improve, failure rates of hardware components have steadily
declined over the years to the point where non-hardware fail-
ures emerged as a dominant issue [9]; where as the reduction
of troubleshooting complexities and time to fix a problem seem
to be the most important aspects when investigating failures of
electronic systems.
In addition to the a priori discussions from Part I, this paper
focuses on the following:
1. No Fault Found Occurrences in Systems
2. Emerging Resolution Practices
3. Improvements in Test Abilities
4. Discussion on Gaps in Literature
5. Future Research Directions
1Although, there are specific approaches, such as ‘robust design’ [8], that
can be used to design quality into products and processes; by minimizing the
effects of the causes of variation, without eliminating the cause.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows; after
identifying the common root causes for NFF in system com-
ponents, the brief survey’s some industry specific innovations
that have been introduced in order to capture troubleshooting
data. Section 4 discusses improvements in test capabilities; fol-
lowed by a discussion on the identified gaps in NFF literature.
Finally concluding remarks and future directions for research
into testability methods, and the necessary design guidance to
mitigate the problem are cover in Section 6.
2. No Fault Found Occurrences in Systems
2.1. Electronic Systems
Electronic failures are not often considered as static nor ran-
dom (or pseudorandom) events, but rather the result of mechan-
ical and material changes [9, 10]. These changes seldom lead to
a loss of functionality of an electronic system, even though their
components maybe out of specification. This is due to the elec-
tronics having an inherent self-compensating aspect that makes
the task of failure diagnostics difficult and directly contributes
to a successful diagnosis. In addition, degradation of failure
modes often manifest differently depending upon the operating
environment that may offset components and the circuit con-
figuration [11]. Thomas et al. (2002) [12] and Renner (1999)
[13] investigated the root causes of NFF in automotive elec-
tronic systems. It was revealed that an overwhelming majority
of occurrences can be traced back to poor manufacturing (i.e.
soldering and Printed Circuit Board (PCB) assembly) and in-
herent design flaws which include violation against specifica-
tions. Vichare and Pecht (2006) [10], Qi et al. (2008) [14] and
Moffat (2008) [15] have summarized some generic causes of
failures within electronic systems:
1. Interconnect failures (including connectors)
2. System design (electrical and mechanical)
3. Environmental conditions (temperature, moisture, chemi-
cals, mechanical stresses)
4. Operator handling (ergonomics, training)
5. Printed circuit Boards (PCB)
6. Ageing components and connectors
7. Loose PCB interconnectors
8. Disconnected solder points
9. Damaged wiring or cabling
A recent aerospace survey [16] has ranked intermittent faults
as the major cause of NFF events, whereas Built-In-Test Equip-
ment (BITE) coverage and software are least likely. This is
contrary to the common belief that the majority of failures are
due to incompatible or competing software routines between
systems [17]. Intermittency is arguably the most problematic
of the NFF events due to their elusive nature, making detec-
tion by standard test equipment difficult [5]. The faulty state
will often lay dormant until a component is back in operational
use, where it eventually causes further unit removals unless a
genuine cause is found (fault isolation). It should be empha-
sized that these failures are not always present during testing,
which make them troublesome to isolate. This situation can re-
sult in repeated removals of the same equipment for the same
symptom, with each rejection resulting in the equipment being
tagged as NFF [18]. At this stage, there is a very high proba-
bility that there will be a loss of system functionality, integrity
and an unacceptable compromise in safety requirements. What
is clear is that even though these faults may begin as short dura-
tion low frequency occurrences, as time passes the underlying
cause will increase the severity of the intermittency until even-
tually a hard fault appears and the functionality of the system is
compromised or lost.
2.1.1. Printed Circuit Board Interconnectors
Information published by Gibson et al. (1997) [19], claims
that between 50-70% of all electronic device failures could be
attributed to its interconnectors. Even though solder joints can
fail by a variety of mechanisms, the device ‘interface’ seems to
be the most common cause2. Over time, contaminations on the
fractured surfaces initiate a failure sequence which starts with
degraded joints and eventually progress to intermittent failures.
Products that have a dependency upon the behavior of inter-
facing devices for correct operation are also susceptible to faults
which can be categorized as intermittent. This is common in
products that rely on software for their correct operation (or in-
teraction) with other products. In these cases, they may exhibit
periodic failures due to inherent incompatibilities between the
system interfaces; symptoms may include relative timing errors
and synchronization issues. The systems may not show any ev-
idence of failure for many years of service, but as the system
interfaces become affected by wear and drift, failures become
evident. This can result in a root cause misclassification, with
the root cause being diagnosed as component ageing rather than
the fundamental design issue with the interface.
Another major contributor to solder joint damage is thermal
stress related to heat expansion, shock and vibration. During
operation, these stresses causes metal-metal interconnects to
rub against each other to damage any protective coating. Such
effects cumulate over time, and will typically last for periods
less then hundreds of nanoseconds. Such manifestations frac-
ture the solder contacts and instigate intermittent faults. Elec-
trical intermittency is also caused by contact fretting [15, 20].
Fretting corrosion occur particularly in tin plated contacts, as
a degradation mechanism caused by the presence of humidity
which oxidizes the metal-metal interface. The accumulation of
oxides at the contacts causes an increase in resistance and elec-
trical intermittency due to the repetitive sliding movements.
Other root causes of NFF events in electronics include creep
corrosion, and the phenomena known as tin whiskers [14].
Creep corrosion is a mass transport process in which solid cor-
rosion products migrate over a surface on Integrated Circuit
(IC) packages and eventually result in electrical shorts (or sig-
nal deterioration) due to the bridging of corrosion products be-
tween isolated leads. Depending on the nature of corrosion
2These failures can occur under several scenarios, a common failure is
where surface-mount packaging used are knocked off during socket insertion.
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product (conductive or semi-conductive, dry or wet), the insu-
lation resistance can vary, thus potentially causing intermittent
loss of signal integrity. A pure tin finish is well known to pro-
duce conductive ‘metal whiskers’, that are capable of producing
unintended current paths. These failures usually appear inter-
mittently, making it difficult to identify them as a root cause
to the problem; they are easily broken off and can melt to re-
move a previously existing short3 [8]. In the case of a reported
failure where there is no ‘hard’ (or definite) symptom for a suf-
ficient fault diagnosis; there will be the need for additional tech-
nical data or specialist technical knowledge. This can be in the
form of maintenance history, troubleshooting guides or exper-
tise from experienced colleagues and specialists [2, 5].
2.1.2. Harness Wiring
A key aspect of interconnect and wiring related failures is
that they will often not be detected by traditional one-path-at-a-
time sequential mode of analysis [22]. The traditional approach
not only fails to spot time-dependant failures (such as those ex-
hibited under vibration), but could inherently ignore combina-
torial faults that occur due to wire-to-wire interactions. Another
issue is when chafed wiring occurs where a harness is routed
through a structure that experiences high vibration levels. Un-
less adequate protection (such as cable clamps, ties, sleeving
etc) are provided, the wiring bundle will brush the structure in
such a way that damages internal wiring without external ev-
idence. Such type of wiring faults are extremely difficult to
detect and can lead to risk the maintenance crew rejecting prod-
ucts incorrectly, which are associated with this particular signal
path. Wire breaks are common in harnesses, and are likely to
manifest as a hard fault for a period determined by the vibration
and temperature profile. However, in order to correctly isolate
the failure in an ambient environment, stressing of the harness
may be necessary to simulate the conditions in which the fail-
ure occurred. In cases where fault is intermittent and the exact
operating conditions are not known, the failure may not be cor-
rectly attributed as ‘being in the harness’; which will lead to the
suspicion that the unit is at fault and requires replacing. This is
particularly true for those maintainers who operate within the
constraints of fast turnaround times.
2.2. Mechanical Systems
The failure mechanisms within a mechanical system are
widely regarded as having less of an effect upon the rate of NFF
occurrences than those which are present within electrical sys-
tems. The causes of failure in mechanical systems are similar to
those in electrical systems, such as ageing, poor maintenance,
incorrect installation or usage. The difference however is that it
is much easier to predict the effect upon the systems operation
with mechanical failures. As a result this allows inspection cri-
terions to be developed during the design phases [23]. It should
be noted that as with many electrical failures, mechanical fail-
ures can be intermittent in nature and only occurring under spe-
3
—also, tin whisker growth is much more likely in lead-free solder to cause
short circuits [21].
cific operating conditions. Some of the more common mechan-
ical failures which are of interest but receive a lot less attention
then the electrical failures which contribute to diagnostic failure
are:
1. Broken seals and leaks: Leaks from broken seals will af-
fect the operation of items which include engines, gear-
boxes, control actuators and hydraulic systems. The nature
of seal design is that they are often designed to slightly
weep. This is a good example of the need for maintenance
personnel to be familiar with the system and hence be
aware of what constitutes acceptable leakage in order to
avoid unnecessary removals.
2. Degradation of pneumatic and hydraulic pipes: Degrada-
tion within pipes often occurs due to corrosion or fret-
ting against other components or structures. The nature
of pneumatic/hydraulic systems is that under pressure they
may develop small leaks. These minor leaks may result in
an alarm to the operator indicating failure, resulting in the
unwarranted shut down of the system, when no equipment
malfunction has actually occurred.
3. Backlash in mechanical systems: One area where backlash
can cause significant concern is within actuation systems,
particularly those used for aircraft control surfaces. It is
possible that with excessive wear in actuator couplings,
position sensors may indicate incorrect operation, includ-
ing asymmetric settings, which are difficult to isolate from
a maintenance perspective.
2.3. Software Systems
It is clear that a great deal of NFF occur in avionics, electri-
cal and electro-mechanical systems, however research discus-
sions have also revealed that software (including Built-In-Tests
(BIT)) is also a key contributor to the problem [5, 24, 25, 26].
This includes:
1. Processing delays
2. Discrepancies between software testing procedures
3. Timing errors
4. Lack of appropriate training
5. Perhaps a poorly written program code
Industry specific standards exist (such as IEC 62278 [27] for
railways, or the IEC 60812 [28] is often referred to when car-
rying out Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)4 for soft-
ware based systems), that can be used to validate software op-
eration and meet specific requirements. However, since stan-
dards and guidelines are prepared to be generic, they only
briefly consider the handling of any malfunctions caused by
4FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) is recognized as one of the
most effective methods to identify and remove critical reliability issues. This
procedure is commonly used to influence the system design before it is commis-
sioned, enumerating potential failure modes that may occur during operation.
These are proactively performed to assess the impact of various failure modes
during the product development and maintenance stages [14]. Risk priority
numbers can also be assigned to each of the failure modes, based on factors
such as detectability, severity, and occurrence.
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software faults and their effects in FMEA [29]. Software com-
ponents are often delivered with little access to the source code,
which only provides a partial view of their internal function-
ality. With restricted access in these Off the Self (OTS) so-
lutions, unpredictable effects and integration faults are likely
to undermine critical software functions, which can be difficult
to diagnose and locate [30]. Investigations into failures within
aerospace missions have highlighted critical failures that are
due to such components, along with incomplete software spec-
ifications [31]. Many of the reported issues in this paper can
be attributed to complacency and misunderstanding of software
functions, in the way they interact, and the lack of applying
good practice principles.
In many cases, desired sources of information are not readily
available, or are incorrectly configured to support rapid diag-
nostics, or lack sufficient depth of information and practical-
ity. Additional factors include the failure to complete (or store)
documentation and the lack of robust diagnostic fault trees con-
necting event-system-faults [5]. This results when a unit is re-
placed without determining the nature of the fault, risking its
recurrence to cause an NFF event. The complexity brought by
embedded software and electronics poses unprecedented chal-
lenges in maintenance and repair, threatening customer satis-
faction and causing increasing warranty cost on repair [32, 33].
3. Emerging Resolution Practices
From a technical standpoint, an NFF tagged component is
the result of an unsuccessful (or inefficient) troubleshooting
regime of an ‘unplanned maintenance event’. Several mainte-
nance strategies are usually sought to improve upon this prob-
lem within organizations:
1. Reliability: If all components were 100% reliable (i.e.
they never resulted in a system failure) then there would
be no unplanned maintenance activities. Design engineers
often engage in reliability improvements based largely on
feedback from equipment in service. However, to the ex-
tent that engineers anticipate failures, designers will incor-
porate fault detection systems, notably BIT and prognostic
strategies to keep track.
2. BIT: If BIT’s were 100% comprehensive and unambigu-
ous at the aircraft level (including interacting systems [34])
then it would:
i Detect every possible problem
ii Point with certainty to the defective part, and only
where the problem was caused by a defective part (as
opposed to operator mishandling, environmental cir-
cumstances, etc).
But, to the extent that BIT is lacking, troubleshooting is
required.
3. Troubleshooting: In theory, if Fault Isolation Manuals
(FIM), or troubleshooting guides, were perfect, then ev-
ery failure that can occur on any aircraft would be swiftly
(and correctly) identified by any maintenance personnel,
following step-by-step procedures. However, FIM fails
to identify the problem; the maintainers rely heavily on
their experience [5]. Other resources are often used to help
escalation channels, technician training, supporting docu-
mentation, etc.
4. On-site or practical feedback: To close the loop with re-
liability, new system failure modes are often discovered
adding to the troubleshooting difficulties [26], and acts as
a source of feedback to design engineering for reliability
improvements.
3.1. Health and Usage Monitoring
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) programmes can be
aimed at either fault diagnostics or prognostics5 [35]. Diag-
nostics refers to a posterior event analysis and deals with fault
detection (indicates a fault has occurred), fault isolation (faulty
component is identified) and fault identification (the nature of
the fault is determined). Prognosis is a prior event analysis and
deals with failure prediction before faults occur, making use of
in-situ sensors and physics-of-failure models [27]. If it is pos-
sible to assess in-situ the extent of degradation of electronic
systems, then such data would be invaluable in meeting the
objective of providing efficient fault detection and identifica-
tion. This would include evidence of ‘failed’ equipment found
to function correctly when tagged (as NFF) and hence improve
maintenance processes, extend life, reduce whole life costs and
improve future designs.
There is currently a drive in the majority of industries to turn
away from the more traditional preventive and reactive mainte-
nance actions described above in favor of more predictive and
proactive solutions [21]. Condition Based Maintenance (CBM)
is often regarded as the most advanced predictive maintenance
strategy and hence, could be aimed at reducing the number of
machinery breakdowns by fault detection at an early incipient
stage [5, 10, 36]. CBM makes use of measurements of physical
parameters while monitoring the trends over time; any indica-
tion of abnormal behavior will trigger a warning. In its sim-
plest form, threshold warning levels are constructed to trigger
maintenance activities when a specific parameter shows mea-
surements outside of the threshold regions. In corrective main-
tenance, much of the time is spent on locating a defect which
often requires a sequence of disassembly and reassembly. Re-
cently, condition monitoring of railway wheels with NFF prob-
lems was investigated by Granstrom and and Soderholm (2009)
[37]. The authors provided a perspective on how such tech-
nologies can be applied and utilized for more effective and effi-
cient maintenance management, while initiating a discussion on
the maintenance requirements of systems and the management
regimes which are forced onto those systems. The ability to
automate fault diagnosis, with advanced technologies and tech-
niques, could be used to accurately predict the downtime and
hence the operational availability. In fact, the role of diagnos-
ability analysis in modern systems, considering their complex-
ities and functional interdependencies, becomes significant as
5
—there are other maintenance programmes that do not consider diagnos-
tics or prognostics, e.g. in time-based preventive maintenance where replace-
ment of parts is performance after a predetermined time interval (measured by
a relevant time measure, e.g. hours, cycles or tonnages), independent of the
condition.
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it improvements can lead to a reduction of a system’s life-cycle
costs [38]. However, it should be noted that such setups are only
worthwhile if the benefits can significantly outweigh the costs
of its introduction and upkeep. There are design constraints of-
ten involved with improving maintainability, particularly in the
airline industry when dealing with legacy aircraft. The more
general issues include [39]:
1. Any technological enhancements must work within exist-
ing architectures
2. The information available from lower test levels are typi-
cally predefined and costly to improve or change.
3. Hardware development can be costly and outweigh poten-
tial cost saving benefits.
4. There may be limited space for additional processing ca-
pabilities to support improved diagnostics.
However, the authors would like to emphasize that if there
are no safety (or operational) related consequence of the fail-
ure, then corrective maintenance is probably the most effective
maintenance approach to be adopted. The choice of an appro-
priate strategy for the failure management is guided by method-
ologies such as ‘Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)6’
[42, 43] for military aviation and other applications, or ‘Main-
tenance Steering Group-3 (MSG-3)7’ [46] for civil aviation.
3.1.1. Monitoring and Reasoning of Failure Precursors and
Loads
The basis of health monitoring is built upon the premise that
there exist precursor indications of failure in the form of some
change in a measurable parameter/signal of the system which
can be correlated with a subsequent failure mode [9, 47]. Us-
ing this causal relationship, it is assumed that failures can then
be predicted with the correct approaches to reasoning. The first
step in health monitoring is to select the life-cycle parameters to
be monitored. This can be done systematically through a Fail-
ure Mode Event and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)8. For exam-
ple, a measurable parameter which can provide an indication of
impending failure (or a ‘failure precursor’) for cables and con-
nectors can include impendence changes, physical damage or
a high-energy dielectric breakdown. By monitoring changes in
these precursors, a system’s health status and additional prog-
nostic information can be evaluated, and unexpected failures
could be avoided. A summary of potential failure precursors
for electronics is defined by Born and Boenning (1989) [49].
The life-cycle environment of a product consists of manu-
facturing, storage, handling, operating and non-operating con-
ditions, which may lead to physical/performance degradation
6Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a structured approach to en-
sure that assets continue to do what their users require in their present operating
context [40, 41].
7Maintenance Steering Group-3 (MSG-3) based maintenance provides a
top-down approach to determine the most applicable maintenance schedule,
and the interval for an aircraft’s major components and structure. The method-
ology effectively delivers significant improvements in an aircraft’s availability
and operational safety, whilst optimizing the costs of ownership [44, 45].
8Failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is an extension of
FMEA [48].
of the product to reduce its service life. Suppliers and op-
erators, particularly within the airline industry, spend signifi-
cant resources attempting to determine the root causes of the
NFF events, but without any measured field conditions, a root
cause analysis can be problematic for capturing information.
This poses an even more significant challenge that requires ad-
ditional specific sensing equipment and data loggers. Burns
et al. (2002) [50] demonstrate the development, laboratory
and in-flight testing of such specific equipment for monitoring
the environment of aircraft avionic power system. The equip-
ment termed the ‘Aircraft Environment Monitor Power Quality
(AEM PQ)’, allows over two years of continuous data measure-
ments to be collected for evaluation of the quality of power sys-
tems for different operational scenarios. The hardware and data
gathered is a prime example of the information gathering abil-
ities which are required to evaluate the influence of life-cycle
loads on a specific mission critical system. The added bonus of
this data is that it provides the foundations to troubleshooting
NFF’s, which can aid in re-evaluating system (avionic) design
and establishing models for life cycle analysis.
Life cycle monitoring has been used to conduct prognostic
Remaining Useful Life (RUL) estimates of circuit-cards inside
of a space shuttle’s solid rocket booster [51]. Vibration time
history was recorded throughout all stages of the shuttle’s mis-
sion and used with physics-based damage assessment models to
predict the health and time before the next expected electronic
failure. A similar methodology was applied to the end effector
electronics unit inside the space shuttle’s remote manipulator
systems robotic arm [52]. In this case, loading profiles for both
thermal and vibrational loads were used with damage models,
inspections and accelerated testing to predict the component in-
tegrity over a 20 year period. Lall et al. (2007) [53] presented a
methodology to calculate prior damage in electronic intercon-
nects operating in harsh environments and hence subjected to
highly cyclic and isothermal thermo-mechanical loads with as-
sessment predictions in good correlation with experimental data
using a health monitoring tools.
Understanding electronics from a system point of view,
rather than a set of individual components, is claimed by VEX-
TEC Corporation to be paramount to developing life-cycle
prognostic models as part of a failure reduction methodol-
ogy [11]. The proposed methodology has far reaching conse-
quences on how the operators can manage a fleet of aircraft
based upon risk, rather than guessing degradation levels. It is
argued that by doing this, NFF failure events can be reduced by
the ability to prioritise the order of components replaced dur-
ing a reported failure event, based on probabilities. Developing
methodologies and damage assessment algorithms are gener-
ally aimed at creating an in-situ load monitoring and prognostic
capability. This is explored by Vichare et al. (2007) [54] who
provides the necessary considerations for raw data processing
during in-situ monitoring and methods to reduce memory re-
quirements and power consumption. These are key factors that
often limit the integration of health monitoring systems, partic-
ularly into aircraft. Skormin et al. (2002) [55] developed fail-
ure prognostics for aircraft avionics using data mining models
with measured parameters which included vibration, tempera-
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ture, power supply, functional overload and air pressure. These
parameters, measured in-situ use time stress measurement de-
vices. The purpose of the model included understanding how
the role of measured environmental factors impact upon a par-
ticular failure, investigating the role of combined parameter ef-
fects and to re-evaluate the probability of failure on the known
exposure to adverse conditions.
3.1.2. Knowledge Sharing
Engineers have recently empathized that there is need for
‘on-field experience’ to be shared within a troubleshooting
workflow repository [21]. Aspects of content sharing (such
as e-maintenance [56]) can be beneficial for other maintenance
personnel who will then be able to identify the cause of a prob-
lem on their first attempt, whenever (or wherever) it next oc-
curs. Furthermore, the captured knowledge, over time, can as-
sist designers in improving the reliability of the equipment.
At the core of the challenge for better troubleshooting is the
difference between ‘anticipated failures’ captured within the de-
sign and the ‘actual failures’ that appear in service. When com-
plex equipment is designed, engineers typically identify the po-
tential failure modes and their effects on the system using a
FMEA. With this information, it can be determined how best
to employ On-Board Diagnostic (or BIT) technologies to detect
failures. These can implement Prognostics and Health Moni-
toring (PHM) strategies to detect impending functional failures.
In addition, this can also prepare troubleshooting procedures, in
advance, for analyzing the functionality of the system in order
to differentiate among the many possible root causes of these
anticipated failures. Procedures are contained in troubleshoot-
ing manuals or guides which require human involvement to exe-
cute the tests and evaluate the results. As good as they are, these
systems are often far from perfect nor should they be expected
to be, given the necessary practical cost/performance tradeoffs
[5, 57]. Furthermore, existing RCM standards (such as IEC
60812 [29] FMEA, IEC 60300-3-11 [42], SAE JA1012 [43]),
and experts related to FMEA (Moubray (1997) [41], Stamatis
(1995) [58]), emphasize the importance of continuously updat-
ing them and making sure that it is a ‘living’ document that
reflects new knowledge and gained experiences. This impor-
tance of continuous improvement is also emphasized by related
standards such as IEC 60300-3-14 [53] and EN 50126 [27] (or
IEC 62278 [52]). It should be highlighted that FMEA analy-
sis directly contributes to the development of effective mainte-
nance procedures (e.g. RCM and MSG-3 in the aircraft industry
incorporate FMEA as the primary component of analysis), as
well as the identification of troubleshooting activities, mainte-
nance manual development and design of effective built-in-test
requirements.
When the equipment enters service, the ‘Practical World’ im-
poses itself, as shown in Fig. 1, some faults that were antici-
pated will actually happen; but some never do. When a frac-
tion of the theoretically possible failure modes occur, the weak-
nesses in a piece of equipment will become evident during the
operation. It can then be extrapolated that equipment which
fail on one aircraft, are more likely to fail on other aircraft of
the same design, operated in similar conditions. But most im-
portantly, many real-world faults are not anticipated by the de-
sign engineers, and therefore the traditional diagnostic systems
do not resolve them. In those cases, human ingenuity may re-
solve the problem but where does that knowledge reside after
its creation? Some the knowledge can make its way back into
troubleshooting manual updates [36, 59], and some may be fed
back to engineering to modified designs for much more reliable
parts [60]. However, most of the knowledge only resides within
the heads of a few key experts, or in personalized organizational
databases which usually are consulted only after a problem has
resisted several attempts at resolution. Therefore, on-site ex-
perience must be blended with other diagnostic and prognostic
tools and techniques [42]. The obvious challenges here are:
1. To store this experience-based knowledge, and deliver it at
the time and place that the same problem symptoms occur,
so that it can be re-used to help solve the problem on the
first attempt.
2. To deliver that knowledge in a form that is useful to experts
and less-experienced technicians alike.
3. To share this knowledge so that everyone benefits from the
experience of others
4. To integrate the knowledge access with the existing trou-
bleshooting tools so that it becomes part of the usual trou-
bleshooting workflow.
Human factors must be considered with respect to trou-
bleshooting performance [61]. A diagnostic reasoning system
could hence be useful to provide an such information, along
with high quality feedback to the design engineers [62]. With
the entry of symptoms, the possible failure modes can be iden-
tified from the knowledge database9, and increasingly incisive
information can be requested. To the troubleshooter, this can act
as efficient guidance; to the design engineer, this can be an intel-
ligent interview automatically being applied anytime that these
failures modes appear. When completing the troubleshooting,
the maintainers can automatically report on the failure mode
and record detailed differentiating symptoms. Also, this in-
formation can be of great importance for a ‘Failure Reporting,
Analysis, and Corrective Action System’ (FRACAS)10’ proce-
dure, providing valuable insights to engineers [42, 64].
3.2. Test Equipment
Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) is widely used to perform
device functional and parametric tests at the back-end of the
semiconductor manufacturing process [9]. It is a capital in-
tensive system and typically costs $1–$3M depending on the
equipment performance. An unscheduled equipment downtime
lasting one hour could cause significant amounts of production
loss.
9Various reliability and maintenance databases can been compiled, such as
[63], eliciting information useful in scheduling maintenance and design activi-
ties.
10FRACAS (Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System) is
a reactive procedure often utilized after failures have occurred within a system.
It is used to collect data, report, categorize, analyze information, and to plan
corrective actions in response to those failures.
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Figure 1: Troubleshooting: Anticipated vs Actual Faults.
The use of reflectometry has commonly been used to de-
termine the integrity of cables and wiring with effective lo-
calization of intermittent faults such as open or short circuits.
These methods send a high frequency signal down the line,
which reflects back at impedance discontinuities. The location
of the fault is determined by the phase shift between the inci-
dent and reflected signals. Sharma et al. (2007) [65] demon-
strates a novel architecture for implementing a Sequence Time
Domain Reflectometry (STDR) method, which uses a pseudo-
noise code to locate open and short circuits on active wires us-
ing an integrated CMOS sensor. The approach has an accuracy
of fault localization of 1ft with low power consumption for the
sensor. Lo and Furse (2005) [66] provide research into simi-
lar faults but using a differing kind of reflectrometry known as
Noise-Domain Reflectrometry (NDR) which make use of exist-
ing data signals in the wiring. With this method results show the
potential to localism intermittent faults within 3 inches in 180ft
of electrical wiring. However, caution must be taken when us-
ing these methods as little is known on the impedance profile of
intermittent faults (with exception to open and short circuits).
Also promising are reflectometry methods, that are proving to
be useful when applied to locating intermittency in an F-18
flight control harness [67]; they do require exceptional accu-
racy in baseline comparisons. In civil and military aerospace,
recording and maintaining TDR data archives, for even a lim-
ited number of circuit’s, may prove to be enormous and costly
[68]. Another technique, called spread-spectrum time-domain
reflectometry (SSTDR) is commercially being used to identify
faults in electrical wires by observing reflected spread spectrum
signals Parkey et al [69].
CMOS Integrated Circuits (IC) are routinely tested using
supply current monitoring which is based upon the knowledge
that a defective circuit will produce a significantly different
amount of current than fault-free circuits. Smith and Campbell
(2000) [70] have developed an in-situ quiescent current moni-
tor that detects, in real-time, elevations in the leakage current
drawn by the IC whilst in a stable state. Other similar current
monitors have been reviewed by Pecht (2006) [43]. Damage to
electronic solder joints are a major contributor to intermittency
in electronics and hence are a direct contributor to the NFF phe-
nomena. Damaged solder points are notoriously difficult to de-
tect without extensive visual inspections. They do however pro-
duce large variations in thermal resistance which can be used as
a potential suitable method for monitoring solder joint fatigue
inside of the packaging of power modules. Bhatia et al. (2010)
[71] have used this principle as a basis to develop and test a
new solder-joint fault sensor known as the SJ Monitor which
provides the ability to monitor selected I/O pins of powered-off
FPGA’s. The use of RF impedance is also used as a failure pre-
cursor and offers interesting prognostic capabilities for solder
joint failures due to the nature of gradual non-linear increases
in impedance as damage increase, whereas the DC resistance
becomes constant. The use of RF impedance is researched at
length by Kwon (2010) [72], who demonstrates prognostic ca-
pabilities which are able to predict the remaining useful life of
the solder joint with an error less than 3%. The research also
demonstrates the ability to distinguish between two competing
interconnects failure modes solder joint cracking and pad cra-
tering; the need for such failure distinctions in this case however
is unclear.
The use of embedded molecular test equipment within ICs
enabling them to continuously test themselves during normal
operation, providing visual indications of failure has been pro-
posed by GMA Industries as one of the more advanced and fu-
turistic monitoring technologies [29]. The sensors are used to
measure electrical parameters and various signals such as cur-
rent and voltage, as well as sensing changes in the chemical
structure of integrated circuits that are indicative of developing
failure modes. The basic structure of the sensors are carbon
nanotubes and the integration of these sensors with conven-
tional IC’s along with molecular wires for the interconnecting
sensor networks is the important focus of this research. How-
ever no details of demonstrable in-service products or proto-
types are given and to date no research paper offering proofs on
the applicability of the concept has been found.
Recently, a sensitive analyzer was introduced by Universal
Synaptic to simultaneously monitor test lines for voltage vari-
ation, and seems to have become an attractive tool for detec-
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tion of the intermittency [73, 74]. Conducting the intermittency
test simultaneously provides an increase in probability of detec-
tion; combined with the reduction in the time taken to complete
the test (because the testing is performed for multiple points,
rather than testing one line at a time) means that this is po-
tentially an effective test methodology. It has been used on
the F-16 AN/APG-68 Radar system Modular Low Power Ra-
dio Frequency (MLPRF) unit where $36 million dollars’ worth
of assets, previously deemed ‘unrepairable’ have been returned
as serviceable. The equipment has also shown considerable
promise in the UK military, on the Tornado and Sentinel aircraft
fleets [2]. Other similar work on intermittent fault detection has
been done by Muja and Lamper (2012) [75], and Smith et. al
(2009) [76].
3.2.1. Built-In-Test
As electronic equipment evolve into ever more complex sys-
tems, they increasingly depend upon BIT to provide in-situ fault
detection and isolation capabilities, particularly in low volume
electronic systems in the military, aerospace and automotive
sectors. BIT is a coherent assortment of on-board hardware-
software elements, enabling a diagnostic means to identify and
locate faults as well as error checking. Its importance has there-
fore increased with system complexity, as it enables equipment
maintainability through better testability (IEC 60706-5 [58]). In
accordance to the ARINC 67211 [77], diagnostic testing should
consider multiple level tests (e.g. during operation and at dif-
ferent maintenance echelons). Historically, it is recognized that
BIT had been designed and used primarily for in-field main-
tenance by the end user, but they are now used in evermore di-
verse applications which include oceanographic systems, multi-
chip modules, large-scale integrated circuits, power supply sys-
tems, avionics and also in passenger entertainment systems for
the Boeing 767 and 777 [72]. BIT is used to indicate system sta-
tus, providing valuable information to locate the exact system
components (that need to be replaced) and to indicate whether
or not a system has been assembled correctly.
Failures reported by BIT tests can be costly, and are likely
to result in unit replacements, recertification, or inevitable loss
of availability of the equipment [1]. Even though these checks
may be designed as a means to detect and locate equipment
faults, there are a variety of shortcomings which contribute to
the NFF phenomena. Many experts advocate that the design of
a BIT system is a non-trivial task and rely deeply on the knowl-
edge of all the system interactions [5, 43]. Due to this, it is
often difficult to define a fixed set of test procedures that can
verify the full functionality of a component. This has led to log
reports containing spurious fault detection. For example, op-
erator/pilot reports of faults often do not always correspond to
the test logs, resulting in overlooked maintenance issues. Also,
even with the sophistication of modern tests, there is still a ma-
jor issue of removed units, reported by the test to be at fault, but
upon testing being found to have no faults, or even faults that
do not correlate to the BIT reports. As well as the false alarm
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—this has been discussed in Part 1 Section 4.
issue, other factors such as assessment coverage and inappro-
priate parameter limits, can in turn, contribute to NFF events
[2].
Assessment coverage deals with the nature of the BIT (which
could be designed in several different ways), making the checks
dependent on the monitored equipment and system scale. A
system-wide BIT will either be centralized, where dedicated
hardware is used to control all functions, or decentralized,
where a number of test centers can be incorporated and pro-
cessed at the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) level12. Decentral-
ization of tests enable the ability to check the functionality of
key circuits, helping to identify problems much closer to the
root causes than is the case in the centralized view making for
a cost-effective assembly and maintenance operations [43]. The
nature of BITs will be, in some way, dependent upon a set of
pre-defined statistical limits for the various parameters which
are being monitored. It is important to recognisee at this point
that BIT will report failures for following two reasons:
1. A specified parameter has exceeded a set threshold value
2. The noise of the BIT measurements throws the test results
outside of the testing limits when the System-Under-Test
(SUT) meets required specifications.
The first of these is a direct result of component failure, for
example a burnt out resistor. The second occurs when a mea-
sured parameter which has noise is measured by an instrument
having its own noise, this is common in integrated manufactur-
ing processes, digital system timings and radar systems [78].
One of the areas of concern within these statistical limits is
that they may have been inappropriately set without a true un-
derstanding of hardware-software interactions or the nature of
the equipment’s operating environment. This will therefore in-
evitably lead to BIT false alarms.
3.2.2. Other Methods
Some other techniques which have been proposed include:
1. DC resistance: Traditionally, these techniques have been
utilized to monitor the reliability of electronic compo-
nents, as it is well suited for identifying electrical conti-
nuity. However, these methods do not often provide any
early indication of failure (of physical degradation), and
may not be sensitive enough for future electronics that op-
erate at higher frequencies.
2. RF impedance: Kwon (2010) [72] worked on developing
an RF impedance method to provide an early indication
of interconnect failures. The technique has better sensi-
tivity towards degradation, as compare to its DC coun-
terpart, due to the phenomenon known as the skin effect.
The method takes advantage of the surface concentration
of high speed signals (depending on the material charac-
teristics) being passed through the connection whilst mon-
itoring the frequency response.
12A Line-Replaceable Unit (LRU) level is the lowest level when a modu-
lar (or sub-unit) item of the system can be easily replaced and quickly inter-
changed.
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3. Functional process methodology: In order to eliminate
warranty related NFF events, Izquierdo and Ceglarek
(2009) [33] demonstrated a methodology based on design
tolerances that integrate service (or warranty) data with
manufacturing measurement, and existing product models.
4. Improvements in Test Abilities
Testability, as defined by IEC 60706-5 [72] is a quantitative
design characteristic which determines the degree to which an
item can be tested under stated conditions. As more sophistica-
tion is added to electronic systems, the ability to maintain them
is becoming ever more difficult and costly. Standard testing us-
ing Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) usually includes features
such as timing, signal strength, duplicating the operating envi-
ronment, loading, fanout and properly interconnecting the Unit
Under Test (UUT) [60, 79, 80, 81, 82]. The idea of ATE is
to force the UUT to fail without actually injecting faults. The
ability to do this is directly related to its testability. Testability
is a design-related characteristic, which if designed well will
provide the capabilities to confidently and efficiently identify
existing faults. The number of tests and the information con-
tent of test results, along with the location and accessibility of
test points, define the testability potential of the equipment. The
two attributes which must be met for testability success are:
1. Confidence: this is achieved by frequent and unambigu-
ously identifying only the failed components or parts, with
no removals of good items.
2. Efficiency: this is achieved by minimizing the resources
required to carry out the tests and overall maintenance ac-
tion. This includes minimal yet optimized man-hours, test
equipment and training.
It is evident that the conventional ATE methods used within the
maintenance line as required from the testability design are not
successful [2, 5, 21, 83]. They perhaps are not carrying the nec-
essary levels of confidence and efficiency, or are inappropriate,
in the many industries which are suffering NFF difficulties. If
testability as a design characteristic was successful, NFF would
not be so problematic. This is particularly evident in the case
of attempting to detect and isolate intermittent faults at the test
station. The ability to test for short duration intermittency at the
very moment that it re-occurs using conventional methods is so
remote that it will almost certainly result in a NFF. The one ma-
jor issue with designing component testability is that the focus
is on functionality and integrity of the system [46].
Other difficulties with testability are that in most cases, there
is a complete lack of information regarding standardized tools
for the evaluation of Design for Testability (DfT)13. For testa-
bility to be consistent within the design process, to achieve the
necessary levels of confidence and efficiency, these standard
13There are design techniques that are added to obtain certain testability fea-
tures during hardware product design. The premise of the features is that they
can make it easier to develop and apply manufacturing tests, and to validate that
the product hardware contains no defects that could, otherwise, adversely affect
the product’s correct functioning, e.g. boundary scanning.
definitions, procedures and tools must be developed. A testa-
bility evaluation should not only provide predictions but also
redesign information when testability attributes are predicted to
be below the acceptable levels. There are three testability at-
tributes which can be identified [84]:
1. Fraction of Faults Detected (FFD): Ideally this should
be 100%. Any fault not detected by either the BIT,
BITE or ATE can result in total loss of the system in-
tegrity and hence functionality. In reality some faults, not
safety/mission critical can be tolerated and so a FFD less
than 100% may be acceptable when designing for testabil-
ity.
2. Fraction of Faults Isolated (FFI): If a detected failure is
not isolated quickly and efficiently with high confidence,
then the system may end up being kept out of operation
for significant periods of time. The result of this leads
to pressure on maintenance personnel who are then likely
to adopt the ‘shotgun approach14’ of speculative LRU re-
placements adding pressure and complications to the spar-
ing and logistics processes increasing life-cycle costs. Ap-
propriate measures of FFI include Mean Time to Fault iso-
lation (MTFI), Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) and rates of
NFF.
3. Fraction of False Alarms (FFA) or Rate of False Alarm
(RFA): This is a measure of the rate at which detected
faults results as a false alarm upon investigation. It is com-
puted as a time-normalized sum of false alarms, where the
normalization is either calendar time or operating hours.
High FFA will also lead to maintenance pressures and the
‘shotgun’ effect.
4.1. Detecting Blind Spots
When it is suspected that NFF occurs due to a lack of fault
coverage by the ATE (or BITE), there comes the requirement
to use additional tools which are capable of identifying the root
cause of the problem. Ungar and Kirkland (2003) [79] argue
that to achieve this, an understanding of the Physics-of-Failures
(PoF)15 within the operating environment is needed. Once this
is known, appropriate test equipment can be selected to support
the ATE which through interpretation of the physics, for ex-
ample, of circuits under the test environment to be used as fault
locators; a capability often beyond that of standard ATE. In fact,
Kimseng et al. (1999) identified a PoF process to identify, in-
duce and analyze not only failure mechanisms causing intermit-
tent failures but also high warranty returns and NFF problems
of the digital electronic [85]. As previously discussed, many
of the faults which contribute to NFF events in electronics are
of an intermittent nature. These usually provide a challenge
14
—i.e. the maintainer is left to troubleshoot the system using their ‘best
guess’, which will often result in the replacement and removal of modules that
are perfectly good.
15Physics-of-Failures (PoF) is a concept utilized to understand the processes
and mechanisms that induce failure within a component. This includes studying
physical, chemical, mechanical, electrical, or thermal aspects which influence
the performance of the component over time, until it eventually fails to meet
any system requirements.
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to signal processing algorithms which are often designed with
permanent faults in mind [86]. Some work on resolving such
issues have been carried out using algorithms that make use
of Bayesian networks to decompose large systems containing
multiple components that may potentially fail during operation
[87]. Such probabilistic approaches often prove useful for study
the performance behavior of underperforming subsystems that
eventually lead to a system failure. Typical circuits are usually
tested one at a time, or just a few circuits at a given time and
unless the intermittent fault occurs within the time window of
the test; the fault will go undetected [74]. This is compounded
further by digital averaging of results, which indicates that con-
ventional testing equipment do not provide effective test cover-
age for intermittency; one of the major drivers for NFF.
Other alternatives to address the intermittency problem,
which try to use traditional measurements, include methods
such as tracking and comparing circuits down to fractions of
a milliohm, one-circuit at a time, against long running records
of similar measurements. However there are some major lim-
itations to this approach: when an intermittent circuit is in a
temporary working state it will generally pass such tests and
only those approaching hard-failure status will be detected this
way. Also, measuring ‘fractions of a milliohm’ and attempting
to take meaningful action based on these values is extremely
difficult, time-consuming and requires precise control in the test
set-up and test environment.
Appropriate test equipment is required to address the inter-
mittency issue and to resolve all of the variables causing this
unpredictability providing the maintainer with a quick and com-
prehensive route to a successful outcome. Overcoming the test-
ing challenges posed by intermittent problems require a differ-
ent approach to that of using conventional digital equipment
predicated on accuracy of measurements and time-consuming
results analysis. Truly effective and practical detection of in-
termittency requires improved test coverage and, consequently,
vastly improved probability of detection.
There are also a variety of other high profile integrity testing
methods currently being championed. Most notable of these are
the use of X-ray and thermal imaging. X-ray inspections that
can highlight shorts, or coupling faults buried within the layers
of multiplayer printed circuit boards non-invasively. Sankaran
et al. (1998) [88] discusses the use of X-ray laminogrophy for
accurate measurements of solder joint structures through 3D
image reconstruction using artificial neural networks. Auto-
mated inline systems based on X-ray transmission have sev-
eral advantages over optical inspection. Optical inspection is
restricted to surface inspection of visible solder joints. Conse-
quently leads and ball grid arrays cannot be inspected by opti-
cal means. More sophisticated features concerning the solder
volume, fillet, voids and solder thickness can reliably be deter-
mined only by X-ray transmission. Therefore, by X-ray inspec-
tion, generally a better test performance is achieved in terms of
false alarm rate and escape rate and it is to be favored for closed
loop process control [89].
The use of infrared imaging for non-destructive evaluation
of electrical component integrity is a well-known practice [90].
The basic principle of using infrared imaging as an integrity
test is that faulty connections and components in an energized
circuit operating will begin to heat up before they fail, the use
of a thermoscope, would scan the devices in the circuit from
one end to another and the hotter the target the more energy
that it will emit in the infrared portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum. For many electrical components, such as resistors
and capacitors the build-up of heat will be entirely normal, but
for many components the build-up of heat or even lack of heat
will indicate a problem.
4.1.1. Environmental Testing
The environmental conditions of a product (or system) can
also be analyzed to assess its on-going health, and to provide
an advance warning of failure [54, 91]. Products often behave
differently during varying operational conditions (normal or ex-
treme) which result in fault symptoms manifesting themselves
only under those specific conditions. Examples include when
temperature widely fluctuates or stress is applied in the form of
vibration; conditions which will not normally be present during
laboratory testing. Most products will undergo environmental
testing to prove their reliability and robustness under the most
extreme operating conditions as part of their certification pro-
cess, but a more subtle set of environmental testing can also be
used as part of the maintenance process which tries to simulate
a more normal mode of operation. In effect, when designing for
DfT, information-gathering exercises can be designed to study
system behavior where such variation are present, i.e. Design
of Experiments (DoE) [53]. These may provide essential statis-
tical information for planning experiments on process models,
in order to obtain data that can yield valid and objective conclu-
sions.
In any case, there are three main environmental conditions
which should be controlled for a good diagnostics test; humid-
ity, vibration and temperature. However testing standards do
not require these environmental factors to be done together [2].
Each of these will depend on many factors for example, temper-
ature and humidity will fluctuate with variables such as altitude,
time of year, current weather patterns whilst vibration is depen-
dent upon such things as smoothness of roads/runways, loca-
tion in the vehicle, and the vehicle activity (i.e. a fighter aircraft
cruising or in a battle scenario). These three conditions can be
simulated with relative ease through the use of market avail-
able environmental chambers. White and Richardson (2011)
[92] provide an overview of the differing types available and
the variety of tests which can be carried out in them to inves-
tigate the event of NFF issues for aircraft assemblies. In this
research paper, the authors also warn that environmental test-
ing is not the definite solution to identifying all faults. There is
also a need to get operational information which includes field
data, maintenance history and failure probabilities to determine
if the failure in the unit is real, or if it is in a different unit or
even a false alarm. However, gaining this information can be
tricky and would require additional work on behalf of pilots (or
operators) in recording the events which led to the failure sig-
nal along with changes to procedural practices in maintenance
record keeping (or retrieval). Often an overlooked area when
considering an environmental test is the orientation of the UUT
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when embedded within its operating platform. The orientation
can mean that differing components are more affected by vi-
bration than if the UUT was in a different position and so the
orientation of the UUT should be a consideration when under-
going environmental testing.
4.1.2. Tracking Spare Parts
The ability to recognisee rogue units16 is of paramount im-
portance in mitigating the effects of NFF events and to ensure
operating safety, particularly in the case of an aircraft. The key
to distinguishing a rogue unit is to implement the necessary
procedures to track rogue units by serial number showing the
date installed and removed, the platform on which the unit was
installed, number of operating hours/cycles, number of hours
since its last overhaul and a solid reason for the generated re-
moval codes. In addition to this, the history of the operating
platform (be that a wind turbine, aircraft or train) needs to be
recorded with an easy to use retrieval system [2]. The impor-
tance of such historical data is to aid in determining the exact
effects the failure has on the overall system and whether the
replacement of the unit offers a high level of confidence of rec-
tifying the problem.
Some airlines in the UK, operate within a spare parts pool
where the policy is that if a unit is returned to the pool labeled
NFF more than three times then that unit will be scrapped. This
has the advantage that the spare parts pool will become less
polluted with units which are rogue. However, this only encour-
ages the culture of accepting NFF and not searching out the root
cause which may be a fundamental manufacturing flaw present
in equivalent units, such as a batch of faulty capacitors which
have been used in the unit’s production. Likewise, it could be
a system design flaw leading to integration faults. Either way,
scrapping units in this way will inevitably lead to an increase in
costs [5].
Other airlines routinely tag and track units that come back
with similar reported failure symptoms multiple times. These
tagged units are then subjected to special testing that is not usu-
ally required such as thermal shock and environmental tests.
Units tagged as rogue are also tracked by the tail number of the
aircraft from which they came. Technicians then ‘monitor and
track’ repetitive serial numbers using specialized tools to help
determine if the unit is a repetitive problem or if the problem
is fundamentally an issue with the aircraft [93]. In the case of
airlines which are contracted into a spare parts pool utilized by
several airlines the lack of ‘tracking by design’ of units sus-
pected of being rogue means that an airline has no information
regarding any unit that they take from the pool.
Advanced tracking methods have begun to gain popular-
ity particularly in the aircraft industry which is based upon
RFID tracking for predictive maintenance [94]. In the repair
process, multiple operations are conducted to repair a com-
plex engineered machine (such as an engine) which would in-
clude dismantling, inspection, repairing, maintenance and re-
16Units which have been taken out and sent back for repair multiple times
are tagged as ‘rogue units’.
assembling. Tracking and tracing of the status of these pro-
cesses and operations provides critical information for decision
making. This tracking and tracing is often performed manually
but the adoption of RFID as an automatic identification technol-
ogy has the potential to speed up processes, reduce recording
errors and provide critical part history [95]). The use of RFID
technology to track units within a spare parts pool providing full
service histories to the current user [96] has also provided the
ability to reduce the number of NFF events identifying rogue
units in the spare parts pool; reducing costs attributed to phan-
tom supply chains.
The use of RFID technology over recent years has begun to
be taken very serious by major aerospace manufactures (such as
Messier-Dowty) for use in future landing gear health manage-
ment systems and the world’s two dominant airlines Boeing and
Airbus. In 2005, Boeing announced that in order to improve
its ability to track and maintain service histories of its parts,
it would require many suppliers of high-value parts to its new
787 Dreamliner aircraft to place RFID tags on all parts before
shipping them to Boeing. Even though RFID tagging is consid-
ered an expensive option, Boeing argues that for the additional
cost of $15 per tag for a $400, 000 primary flight computer, the
life-cycle information gained would more than justify the addi-
tional expenditure to their customers [97]. In early 2012, Boe-
ing Commercial Aviation Services were still awaiting Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) certifications for RFID track-
ing systems aimed as a standard component on all new 737,
777 and 787 commercial aircraft as well as a variety of their
military aircraft. Similarly, Airbus is also promoting the adop-
tion of RFID in the aircraft industry, and are developing RFID
part tracking systems for their new A400M military transport
plane as well as for the A380 commercial jet [98].
5. Discussion on Gaps in Literature
In the past few decades, there has been a great deal of re-
search in order to address the NFF issue but solutions to miti-
gate the problem are certainly not universal even within some
individual organizations, let alone across a common industry
sector. Some of this effort is being directed at the design
and production stages where there is a need to create more
fault-tolerant systems which perhaps incorporate in-built redun-
dancy, or self-testing mechanisms. Also, there is a requirement
for some thorough research effort into understanding intermit-
tency. Understanding intermittent faults will rely on the abil-
ity to describe the various interactions accurately and how me-
chanical, software and electronic elements all have to interact
together. Modeling of intermittent faults will be required, but
will need to include probabilities of fault detection and the ef-
fects intermittent failures have on other dependant systems. A
thorough understanding of individual systems will be required
in order to provide fault models and models that deal with false
BIT alarms and the root causes of BIT deficiency. In some in-
dustries and individual companies, adopting better prognostics
has ensured that important operational parameters are moni-
tored at all times to identify adverse and out of limits varia-
tions. These technologies have helped to introduce a change
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from a policy of reactive maintenance, to a predictive policy
which would concentrate on providing vital information on the
root causes of failures, which is not provided with traditional
BIT/BITE. Other technology improvements such as the use of
RFID technology has been adopted to track units within the
supply chain, and to monitor the complete service history of
items while they are in the supply chain. Such technology so-
lutions will go some way to mitigating NFF but what is needed
is a comprehensive approach dealing with organizational, pro-
cedural and behavioral issues as well as all the technical issues.
The ability to map a NFF event from the initial reported failure
through the entire maintenance process would provide invalu-
able information identifying the critical operations and proce-
dures which are failing.
From the literature research within this paper, it is possible to
identify the following core gaps in NFF failure related research:
1. The Problem of Intermittency: It is clear that intermittent
fault occurrences are a major technical root cause of NFF
and that there is a clear lack of fundamental understand-
ing on intermittency in electronics. Also, there is clear
evidence to suggest that the current technology in use for
detecting and locating the source of the intermittency is
inadequate. If NFF becomes worse over time despite im-
proved management processes, then the cause is likely to
be an inadequate equipment for testing electrical intermit-
tence. In this case, there needs to be a change in the way
an electronic device or wiring harness is tested in order
to solve the problem. The nature of the NFF needs to be
understood and tracked within equipment and if there is
an intermittent NFF problem then the equipment requires
NFF intermittency-capable testing equipment.
2. Integrity Testing: Most standard maintenance procedures
employ only functional testing which determine if the
equipment is within appropriate tolerances for service.
They do not capture the level of ‘damage’ or ‘degradation’
within the equipment, information which could be vital for
predicting the probability of intermittency or other fail-
ure modes. Integrity testing should be incorporated into
the maintenance process and data management techniques
should then be developed to provide a diagnostic history
and prognostic capability. It is proposed that assessments
of currently available testing methods should be investi-
gated and developed to provide this integrity assessment
capability.
3. Maintenance Manuals: The current standard in trou-
bleshooting guidance is the Fault Isolation Manual. These
manuals can be costly to produce and maintain within a
dynamic environment, and are often tied to the technical
publications cycle, usually meaning several months be-
tween updates. Depending on organizational and cultural
factors, it might not be effective to put all the troubleshoot-
ing knowledge in a paper-based (or electronic) guidance
format, and hence a diagnostic reasoning engine might be
an effective system to implement [42].
4. Achieving Diagnostic Success: In order to improve diag-
nostic success rates, improvements need to be made to pro-
cesses, procedures and technology which have failed. Ini-
tial research shows that work towards this goal is patchy
and there is definitely more to do. There is almost certainly
not one universal industrial solution. The current key ar-
eas for NFF mitigation are focused around understanding
test coverage represented by BIT/BITE/ATE deficiencies,
development of new maintenance troubleshooting tools,
techniques and concepts as well as changes to manage-
ment processes. Accurate fault models, fault/event trees
and system understanding, are paramount to recognizing
false BIT alarms (caused by such things as a sensor sys-
tem synchronization). Also, new systematic tests should
be identified in the product design. These tests would aim
at allowing multiple testing of stressors, identifying weak-
nesses and flaws, and the critical contributors to failures
before the product is put into service.
6. Concluding Remarks
An important part of any new research subject is the design
and maintenance of a reference collection of relevant publi-
cations. To the best of the authors knowledge, the performed
study has moved the body of scientific knowledge forward by
reviewing existing literature related to NFF and pointing out
core gaps where current efforts should be focused on. An at-
tempt is made to comprehensively review academic journal lit-
erature and conference proceedings on the topic. The aim is
to provide a general picture of the research areas, undertaken
in past few decades, and create a database of the academic lit-
erature of journal publications on NFF concepts (and its ap-
plications) from 1990 to 2013 by classification and statistical
analysis. It is evident that the NFF phenomenon has gained the
most attention in the last decade. This is possibly due to in-
creasing system complexities, reliability requirements and cost
implications.
The article reported various occurrences and root causes that
have resulted in NFF events. Current industrial practices were
discussed whilst highlighting the importance of capturing and
sharing as much information as possible to support rapid diag-
nostics and troubleshooting workflow. Furthermore, emphasis
was placed on the importance of having feedback mechanisms
to transfer maintenance event information to design engineers;
who can use that information to determine how best to employ
various diagnostics technologies (e.g. BIT, diagnostic reason-
ing, ATE, etc) to detect failures in the future. It seems that the
role of having more specific standards, solely focusing upon
NFF mitigation, might become much more prominent as they
can promote best practice approaches within maintenance sec-
tors. However, solutions will not reside only within different
maintenance echelons, but should also focus on a much broader
scope; considering factors such as design, manufacturing, test-
ing, organizational imperatives, operator priorities, technologi-
cal capabilities, contractual agreements and financial manage-
ment.
This study highlights the fact that the majority of research,
that has been published, primarily lies within aerospace pro-
ceedings (such as IEEE publications and other engineering out-
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lets). Surprisingly there are no dedicated textbooks on the topic,
and the authors strongly feel that the maintenance community
will benefit from its publication. Also, the authors advocate that
the focus of published material needs shifting from the techni-
cal issues towards the business side. This could be used as a
opportunity to quantify the costs involved in NFF events, and
might influence the way contractual agreements are being setup
now-a-days. Each industry sector approaches NFF differently
i.e. OEM, maintenance suppliers and operators, manufacturer,
etc. When unplanned maintenance regimes are initiated, the
costs along the supply chain, warranty, downtime, operational
fines are expected to raise concerns. In either case, researchers
and scientists should target to publish NFF related research in
management and business journals to emphasize its importance.
This will help to promote knowledge, in addition to overcoming
barriers in NFF investment, and the lack of a business case, due
to no standardized methods (or metrics) for costing impacts.
6.1. Future Perspectives
The core areas where efforts should be focused on:
1. Establishing a consistent NFF taxonomy.
2. Failure Knowledge Bases, novel FMEA tools and trou-
bleshooting guides specific for NFF to improve diagnostic
success rates.
3. Development of assessment tools to assess maintenance
capability (or effectiveness) which may include:
i Recording and cross referencing test station configura-
tion and performance statistics with NFF occurrences.
This includes statistics on equipment calibrations.
ii Ensuring that the testing environment is correct and
investigations into whether testing procedures need
modification to consider multiple environmental fac-
tors (humidity, temperature, vibration etc) simultane-
ously
4. Introduction of integrity testing as complimentary to stan-
dard ATE (functional) testing procedures.
i Integration of on-board health and usage monitoring.
ii Standardization for intermittent testing and procedures
for dealing with intermittent fault occurrences.
5. NFF specific maintenance cost models for design justifi-
cation and NFF tracking.
6. Modeling of complex interactions between system (and
components) and their physics of failure.
7. Modeling of intermittent failures from a fundamental per-
spective including standardized testing equipment and
procedures.
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